Voter education campaigns often aim to increase voter participation and political accountability. We follow randomized interventions implemented nationwide during the 2009
Introduction
The rationality of voter turnout in political elections is often questioned: unless a person casts the deciding vote, voting has no e¤ect on the outcome (e.g., Fedderson, 2004 ) . This is particularly true in elections where one contender has widespread support and the outcome is fairly certain. If no one votes, however, the electoral outcome is unlikely to re ‡ect the preferences of the electorate.
Not voting is therefore equivalent to free riding on other people's electoral participation. As a consequence, voting is often as a civic duty. Although some countries (e.g., Belgium, Brazil) make voting a legal obligation, most do not. The level of electoral participation therefore depends on the probability voters attribute to being pivotal and the social norms that are in place regarding voting. Peer in ‡uence may a¤ect both.
The purpose of this paper is to study peer e¤ects in political participation. A randomized control trial was organized in Mozambique to study the e¤ect of voter education during the 2009 elections. The study of voter education in developing countries has seen recent attention, as electoral problems like vote-buying (Vicente, 2007 ) , violence (Collier and Vicente, 2009 ) , and low accountability (Banerjee, Kumar, Pande, and Su, 2011 ) have been identi…ed to a¤ect the likelihood that elections translate into public policies that produce broad-based development. Speci…cally Mozambique has seen a dramatic decrease on political participation since the …rst democratic elections in 1994, which has accompanied the consolidation of power of the ruling party. The voter education intervention that we study in this paper therefore focused on increasing participation.
The voter education in Mozambique was implemented in collaboration with a free newspaper and a consortium of local NGOs. Three di¤erent treatments were administered nationwide across four provinces of the country. The …rst was the distribution of the free newspaper, which focused on neutral information about the elections. The second was a text messaging hotline to which citizens could report electoral problems. The third was civic education based on a lea ‡et and text messages focusing on information about the elections. All treatments embedded a clear appeal to voter participation in the elections.
The design of the experiment allowed the identi…cation of targeted and untargeted individuals in treated locations for each of the three treatments, as we selected targeted and untargeted individuals randomly. We are interested in the e¤ect that submitting the campaign to one individual, say i, has on another individual, say j, and whether this e¤ect is stronger if i and j are close in a social or geographical sense. We distinguish between two types of e¤ects, depending on whether j was himself/herself given the campaign or not. If both individuals i and j were submitted to the campaign, we test whether the e¤ect of treatment on j is stronger when j is closer, in a social or geographical sense, to other individuals. We call this a reinforcement e¤ect since it reinforces the e¤ect of targeted treatment on j. To test for the presence of a reinforcement e¤ect, we observe whether, relative to controls, the e¤ect of the campaign on targeted individuals is reinforced by proximity to other individuals in the same location. If individual j was not given the campaign, j may nevertheless have experienced an indirect e¤ect of the campaign compared to individuals in control locations. We test whether the e¤ect of the campaign is stronger if j is socially or geographically close to other individuals. We call this a di¤usion e¤ect since it di¤uses the e¤ect of the campaign to untargeted individuals. To investigate di¤usion e¤ects we test whether, compared to controls, untargeted individuals show stronger e¤ects of the campaign when they have closer social ties to other individuals in their location.
In terms of outcomes variables, we exploit a rich individual dataset including a range of survey measures of individual turnout, a behavioral measure of political intervention as given by the sending of actual text messages, and measures of information and interest about politics.
We also use actual voting records at the level of the ballot station to establish average treatment e¤ects. Crucially we collected detailed measures of social and geographic connectedness between individuals, including measures of chatting, kinship and geographical distance between respondents'houses.
All treatments are documented to have produced increased voter turnout of targeted and untargeted individuals. The hotline was particularly e¤ective in individual data. For ballot station records, both the newspaper and the civic education treatments achieved signi…cant increases in voter turnout. We also document clear increase in information about the election.
The peer e¤ects on voter participation are however quite di¤erent as they are all negative, across reinforcement and di¤usion, and using the di¤erent measures of network centrality. This is true for both voter turnout and our behavioral measure of political participation. These peer e¤ects are particularly strong for the hotline. Information and interest about politics are in line with the average e¤ects of the voter education, as they are positive.
We interpret these …ndings in line with a general framework of costly political participation.
There, voter participation may be induced by the probability of a¤ecting the electoral process and by non-instrumental motivations like civic-mindedness. We argue that the campaign gave information to reassure voters of the integrity of the process and that it raised civic-mindedness.
Both e¤ects should be conducive to increased turnout. That is in line with the average ef-fects that we …nd. However, peer e¤ects could be prone to free-riding as more central voters realize that turnout increases and electoral competition diminishes (as the ruling party has an overwhelming advantage in the electorate).
Our estimation of network e¤ects in the context of a randomized …eld experiment relates to a recent body of literature on the role of networks in aid interventions. Miguel and Kremer (2004) launched this literature by estimating externalities of a deworming school-based programme in Kenya. They estimated the impact of the treatment on control populations. Because their experimental design features programme randomization at the school level, it does not allow for an experimental estimation of externalities within treated schools. More recently, Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) extend the study of externalities to a conditional cash transfer programme.
By exploring a rich set of outcomes at the household level they are able to draw some light into speci…c mechanisms of in ‡uence of unexposed households. However, these authors do not use explicit network variables. Still in the context of a conditional cash transfer programme, Macours and Vakis (2008) introduce explicit interaction among households while focusing on reinforcement e¤ects only, and Angelucci, De Giorgi, Rangel, and Rasul (2010) extend the analysis to di¤usion but focus on kinship links. The studies by Nickerson (2008) , Fafchamps and Vicente (2011) , and Gine and Mansuri (2011) relate closely to our paper as they analyze peer e¤ects of voter interventions. The …rst looks at a door-to-door randomized get-out-thevote campaigning in the U.S. to identify peer-e¤ects in two-member households. The second follows a campaign against political violence in Nigeria to identify reinforcement and di¤usion network e¤ects. The third assesses the impact of a voter awareness campaign on female turnout in Pakistan in which peer e¤ects are estimated using geographical distance and friendship. Our analysis of kinship as a measure of social interaction is also related to Bandiera and Rasul (2006) who study technology adoption in Mozambique in a non-experimental setting.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a conceptual framework, as we present a general framework for the analysis of voter participation. In Section 3 we describe our testing strategy. We then o¤er the context of our experiment in Section 4. The treatments are introduced in detail in Section 5. Subsequently, in Section 6 we describe the data including outcome and network variables. In Section 7 we present our empirical results, including balance tests, average e¤ects, peer e¤ects on political participation, and peer e¤ects on information and interest about politics. Section 8 concludes.
Conceptual framework
To structure our empirical analysis, we present a general framework for the analysis of voter political participation. The focus is primarily on turnout, even though we could think of other forms of political participation as well (e.g., open letter). The starting point of our e¤ort is the idea that an educational campaign about elections raises the information level of voters. This a¤ects their beliefs -e.g., in the fairness and transparency of the electoral process -and hence the interest they have about the voting process. People then adjust their behavior to re ‡ect their new levels of information and interest. The campaign may also trigger various forms of peer e¤ects which can impact the same outcomes.
We formalize this as follows, based on numerous sources as summarized by Dhillon and Peralta (2002) and Fedderson (2004) . Let us assume that an individual i takes an action vector x i (e.g., casting a vote, voting for a speci…c candidate, sending text messages with political content) to maximize the following payo¤ function:
where G(x i ; x i ) is the outcome of the electoral process, x i is the combined action of individuals other than i, denotes i's information set, and cx i (with c > 0) is the total material cost of the action (e.g., transport cost, opportunity cost of time, cost of text messaging). To capture non-instrumental motivations -e.g., civic-mindedness -we allow x i to enter the function U independently from the outcome of the voting process G. This could be related to either intrinsic or extrinsic motivations. The latter could be due to the subjective or social cost of deviating from a behavioral norm (e.g., Akerlof, 1997 ) .
The …rst order condition is:
This framework can be used to illustrate how we expect a voter education campaign to in ‡uence voter participation. First, the campaign can change voters'information set i . Distributing information about the electoral process may convince voters of the integrity of the process, thereby raising E i h @U @G @G @x i i . Second, the campaign may increase non-instrumental motivation @U=@x i by raising civic-mindedness (and the emotional cost of not voting). Both channels are conducive to increasing voter participation: that is the direct impact we expect from the voter education campaign that we study.
If we take turnout as our explicit measure of voter participation, some di¢ culties may arise as we assume the absence of non-instrumental motivations (if
We know a single vote has little e¤ect on the electoral outcome -@G(x i ; x i )=@x i is small. It follows that voting is not individually rational unless the cost of voting c is minimal. That constitutes the paradox of not voting that dates back at least to Downs (1957) . However a lively debate has followed. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) proposed a game-theoretic voting game with two candidates and found a high turnout equilibrium: this pattern is generated by a high probability of being pivotal, stemming from having nearly iden-tical numbers of voters supporting each candidate. These results were short-lived as the same authors (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985 ) demonstrated that the introduction of uncertainty and large populations into their earlier model eliminates the possibility that high turnout arises in equilibrium. Recently, Myatt (2012) recovered the idea that the size of @G(x i ; x i )=@x i depends on the perceived competitiveness of the election. Myatt considers a two-candidate election in which there is aggregate uncertainty about the popularity of each candidate. Despite an underdog e¤ect through which higher turnout from the underdog compensates the advantage of the frontrunner, Myatt …nds that turnout is high and that it peaks in elections that are expected to be close.
Apart from proposing a positive impact of voter education on political participation including voter turnout, we argue that it is very likely that the candidate that is expected to win (let us say without loss of generality it is the incumbent) will bene…t most from this increased political participation. To explain this assertion, let us assume a simple world where there is no meaningful electoral competition -this may be a good approximation for the Mozambican context we study in this paper in which the incumbent secured 75 percent of the vote. The election could be thought simply as a turnout contest for the incumbent across locations, as ballot locations compete for clientelistic bene…ts after the election (the incumbent can look at turnout per location to attribute localized bene…ts). Or turnout could be driven by noninstrumental motivations. Either way, and mechanically, higher turnout will be favoring the incumbent. 1 We now turn to peer e¤ects, that is, to the social reinforcement and di¤usion e¤ects trig-1 Another more realistic explanation for favoring incumbents is the two-candidate voting contest of Myatt (2012) . Take the event that the underdog has complete turnout, i.e., that all his supporters actually vote (note that the underdog e¤ect proposed by Myatt may constitute a likely explanation for complete turnout by the supporters of the underdog). Then, an increase in the value of the election induced by voter education can only increase turnout for the incumbent. The same result can be sustained without assuming complete turnout for the underdog to begin with: namely by postulating an increase in the value of the election only for the supporters of the incumbent (this is in line with the clientelistic story mentioned above). gered by the campaign. These e¤ects may be similar to direct e¤ects, as information and civic-mindedness produced by the campaign are cheaply transmitted to peers -see for instance Montgomery and Casterline (1996) on social learning. However, it is likely that peers will take as given the likely e¤ects on political participation, namely the increase in turnout and the increase in voting for the incumbent. If that is the case, we may observe a free-riding peer e¤ect, i.e., a negative e¤ect on political participation as electoral competitiveness is perceived to diminish (given in our setting by the expectation of x i ). This is consistent with Myatt (2012) as mentioned above.
Testing strategy
The combined (i.e., direct and indirect) average e¤ects of the campaign can be estimated as follows. Let y i be a measure of electoral information, interest, or behavior. Let T i = 1 if individual i was visited by the campaign, and 0 otherwise. As we will see when the experiment is described in detail, the campaign took three distinct forms that we test separately. For the sake of the presentation, here we focus on a single treatment.
Assuming treatment is randomly assigned, the homogeneous (average) e¤ect of the campaign can be estimated using a regression of the form:
This regression can also be estimated with village and individual controls. A di¤erence-indi¤erences version could also be used in which …xed e¤ects are employed in order to net out possible time e¤ects and individual unobservables. Coe¢ cient is the average treatment e¤ect on electoral information, interest, or behavior.
Estimating average treatment e¤ects is not the focus of this paper, however. This parameter is covered in detail in Aker, Collier, and Vicente (2011) . Here we focus on peer e¤ects. We …rst estimate the average peer e¤ect of the campaign on individuals/households in treated villages but randomly selected not to be targeted by the campaign. Let these untargeted individuals be denoted by the superscript u. Following Fafchamps and Vicente (2009) , we can then estimate a di¤usion e¤ect. Estimated regressions take the form:
where We also investigate whether peer e¤ects are stronger for targeted individuals who are socially and geographically close to other targeted individuals. Let g ij = 1 if individuals i and j are connected in a relevant social network sense, and 0 otherwise. Alternatively we can de…ne g ij to be the symmetric of the physical distance between i and j. We estimate an heterogeneous reinforcement e¤ect model of the form:
where N is the total number of sampled neighbors, and In this setting the interesting possibility that < 0 while > 0 for electoral behavior outcomes can only be explained, within our conceptual framework, as a manifestation of freeriding: treatment raises the likelihood that others vote (or vote in a certain way); this in turn reduces the marginal usefulness of i's vote; if i is better connected and hence better able to observe the e¤ect of the campaign on others' intention to vote, i's is also more aware of the 2 When estimating the above regression, P j6 =i gij is expressed in di¤erence relative to the mean in the expression P j6 =i gijTi so as to keep the interpretation of the 's una¤ected. 3 In the event that = 0, we cannot rule out the possibility that social network e¤ects are so strong as to spread evenly to all individuals in treated villages, in which case proximity to treated individuals does not matter. reduced usefulness of his/her vote.
Using the same approach we can investigate the presence of heterogeneous di¤usion e¤ects on the untargeted:
Interpretation here is similar to the one of heterogeneous reinforcement e¤ects.
We use ordinary least squares in all our main regressions. Since the data we use is clustered by EA, we need to allow for within-group dependence: we report clustered standard errors at the enumeration area (EA) level.
Context
Mozambique, a country with 22. Guebuza expected to win. The elections were conducted in a relatively unproblematic manner, as witnessed by national and international observers. These observers generally considered it to be following appropriate international standards, despite the existence of many small irregularities.
Results were unambiguous, giving 75 percent of the vote to both Guebuza and FRELIMO (at the presidential and parliamentary elections).
Treatments
The data used in this paper come from a randomized control trial implemented in Mozambique around the time of the 2009 presidential, parliamentary, and provincial assemblies election.
Three treatments are investigated, all geared towards encouraging people to vote. The …rst treatment is a civic education campaign, which gave information about the election and focused on participation in the election; the second is the distribution of an independent newspaper relaying the civic education message; and the third is a campaign to encourage voters to use an and conducted with the institutional support and active collaboration of newspaper @Verdade (http://www.verdade.co.mz/) and a consortium of eight Mozambican NGOs, named Observatorio Eleitoral. For more details on these organizations, see Aker, Collier, and Vicente (2011) .
The civic education treatment was organized around a set of messages providing citizens in selected locations with speci…c information about the 2009 elections. The intervention started with a door-to-door campaign approximately a month before the elections. This was implemented during the baseline survey and was centered on the distribution of a lea ‡et designed and made available by the electoral commission (CNE/STAE). A copy of the lea ‡et is displayed in Figure 1 . It explains in detail the voting steps on the election-day. 10,000 lea ‡ets were distributed (i.e. 250 per location) primarily to survey respondents. Moreover, for two weeks prior to the election, subjects in the civic education treatment received …ve daily text messages on the cell phone number they provided during the baseline survey. The messages focused on the importance of voter participation, as in a 'get-out-the-vote' campaign. Within their 160-character limit, these messages also provide speci…c information about the electoral process, namely: the scheduled date; the type of elections taking place; the presidential candidates; the parties running for parliament; voter con…dentiality; and how to vote. Figure 2 ). The newspaper also advertised a national hotline for reporting electoral problems, but it was branded with a di¤erent slogan and di¤erent short-codes (see right panel of Figure 2 ). For the distribution of the newspapers to treated villages, priority was given to survey respondents. 5,000 copies of the newspaper were distributed each week, with a total of 125 at each location.
The hotline treatment was organized around the setting-up of two short-code phone numbers contracted with the cell phone operators in Mozambique (Mcel and Vodacom). These shortcodes constituted an SMS hotline as they were prepared to receive text messages reporting electoral problems. During the baseline survey, we conducted a door-to-door campaign providing information on the hotline: we distributed 10,000 lea ‡ets (250 per location) primarily directed at survey respondents, providing basic information about the hotline: short-codes, examples, format of the messages to be sent, 6 and the name of the sponsors. The lea ‡et is depicted in Figure 3 . We promised that the contents of these messages would be passed to the media for dissemination, and shared via SMS with all other respondents in hotline treatment locations.
Before dissemination each message received on the hotline was veri…ed with local correspondents that were hired in each of the hotline treatment locations. In addition to receiving hotline reports, respondents in hotline areas were sent SMS reminders about the existence of the hotline two weeks prior to the elections.
Data
The project took place in four provinces, Cabo Delgado, Zambezia, Gaza, and Maputo-Province.
The sampling base was the 2004 electoral map of the country (the 2009 map became available only one month before the election), and the EA unit was the polling location. Because the use of cell phones was central to all our treatments, we eliminated from the sampling base all polling locations without cell phone coverage. For this purpose, we obtained detailed data from the two cell phone operators on the geographic location of each of their antennae. These were then plotted on a map using their geographical coordinates, with a …ve-km coverage radius drawn for each. All polling locations outside the covered area were dropped from the sampling base.
Remarkably, 60 percent of all ballot locations in the country were found to be covered by at least one operator.
From this sampling base, 161 polling locations were selected using two-stage clustered representative sampling -…rst on provinces, then on EAs. The number of registered voters per polling location is used as sampling weight, based on information provided by the CNE/STAE in their electronic publication of (disaggregated) electoral data for the 2004 elections. Since all registered voters in the sampling frame have the same probability of being sampled, the 161 locations are nationally representative of the voting population of Mozambique that has access to mobile phone coverage. Of the 161 polling locations selected for our study, 40 were randomly assigned to each of the three treatments, and 41 locations serve as the control group, with no treatment administered. The allocation of locations to treatments and control follows a strati…ed randomization procedure (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009 ). First, clusters of four similar locations were formed in each province, with similarity based on geography. Within each cluster, locations were then randomly assigned to one of the three treatments or to control. During the baseline survey, in the event that we found no cell phone coverage in a selected location, we replaced it by the closest polling location with cell phone coverage. That happened in seven locations.
In each of the EAs we conducted two face-to-face household surveys, one before the election and treatment, and one after. Sampling in each EA followed standard procedures for household representativeness (e.g., n'th house call by enumerators starting from the center of the EA, Treatment was also randomized across respondents/households within each treated EA. Of the 11 households interviewed at baseline, two were, on average, randomly selected not to receive the treatment themselves. The other nine were directly targeted for treatment as described in the previous section. This was done speci…cally to study di¤usion e¤ects on individuals in treated locations not directly reached by the treatment.
Outcome and network variables
The outcomes of interest in this paper are based on both survey and behavioral data at the individual level, and on the o¢ cial voting results at the level of the ballot station.
Table Appendix presents a summary of the survey outcome variables. These variables have been grouped into three sets: information, interest, and participation, in line with our conceptual framework. Some of these variables were collected both before and after the election. Some questions are only asked in the follow-up survey, such as turnout at the election.
Our proxies of information and interest come, respectively, from questions asking respondents to list presidential candidates and parties running for the 2009 elections, and from questions asking about the interest respondents had on the presidential election, parliamentary election, provincial assemblies'election, and generally on public matters. The latter questions employed a subjective scale. To facilitate analysis and interpretation, we combine the questions described above into two indices, one for basic information about the elections and the other for political interest. The indices are constructed following the approach of Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) .
We normalize the survey-indicators using z-scores and aggregate them using equally weighted averages of the normalized individual variables. The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation. Thus, each component of the index has mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for the control group. 7
We were particularly careful with our measurement of voter turnout. We propose six turnout measures. The …rst one is self-reported turnout. The second is self-reported turnout adjusted by considering as non-voters those who did not answer correctly questions regarding ballot papers and boxes. 8 The third one is an indicator of whether the respondent showed without hesitation to the enumerator a …nger that had been dipped in indelible ink -the method used to prevent people from voting multiple times. Turnout Index 1 is a composite index measuring how well the respondent answered questions on the sequence of events during the election day. The answer to each question is coded according to how convincing the response was. Turnout Index 2 is based 7 Like in Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007) , if an individual has a valid response to at least one component measure of an index, then we impute any missing values for other component measures at the random assignment group mean for the corresponding time period.
8 According to the adjusted turnout those respondents who have reported to have voted but answered wrongly the questions regarding the number of ballot papers and ballot boxes were considered as not having voted and, thus, assigned a zero.
on the sub-group of these questions that focus on knowledge about the ballot station (e.g., the number of ballot papers, whether there were photos of the candidates, the number of ballot boxes, whether they were transparent, and whether they were colored). The last measure of turnout is an enumerator assessment on whether the respondent voted or not. The three last measures take values between 0 and 7 and are thus potentially most informative. To facilitate comparison with the other turnout measures, we normalize them by dividing by 7, so they measure the likelihood that the respondent voted. Finally, we have measures of the respondents'self reported voting for candidates and parties at the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2009.
We then have available a behavioral measure of demand for political accountability, which we refer to as the 'open letter'. During the post-election survey the enumeration team explained and distributed a lea ‡et to all survey respondents in all 161 experimental locations, which invited them to send SMS messages proposing policy priorities to the president-elect for his new mandate. We were clear in conveying the limited extent of the initiative (a small number of experimental localities in the whole of Mozambique), and promised that the contents of these messages would reach the President in person (through the newspaper @Verdade). As with the hotline, each message sent by experimental subjects had a small monetary cost. Sending the message therefore represents a clear costly action. It was observable to us, as all cell phone numbers that sent messages were recorded and matched with those of the experimental subjects.
We interpret the sending of an open letter message as an incentive compatible measure of demand for political accountability. The lea ‡et is depicted in Figure 4 .
Our o¢ cial voting results at the level of the ballot station were made available by CNE/STAE, the electoral commission of Mozambique. We employ results for the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2009. Ballot stations were matched with the enumeration areas in our experiment, which were based on ballot stations themselves. are centrality measures based on chatting and kinship networks, respectively. 9 For the …rst one, a link from i to j exists if i can identify the name of j when prompted, and i stated that he/she talks to j on a regular basis. 10 For the second, a link from i to j exists if i can identify j by name and reports being related to j. 11 The third variable is a measure of geographical centrality calculated as the average distance to other sampled individuals in the same EA. Each enumerator was asked to locate each respondent on an approximate EA map, and to calculate the distance between interviews. See Figure 5 for an example. To evaluate the position of each respondent on the map, we construct up-down and left-right coordinates for each of them. The distance between each ij pair is then calculated from these coordinates. Because maps di¤er in scale, distances are re-scaled to make them comparable across all locations. 12 7. Empirical results 7.1. Balance Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on demographic traits of the baseline and post-elections samples together with balance tests. Comparisons between treatment and control locations show that the samples are overall balanced. Regarding the sample of targeted respondents, only three demographic characteristics are signi…cantly di¤erent at the 10% level. In the sample of untargeted individuals the number of signi…cant di¤erences is reduced to two. The comparison between control and treated EAs in the follow-up survey is also presented in Table 1 . We see a similar pattern: in both samples of targeted and untargeted respondents, most household demographics and EA characteristics are not signi…cantly di¤erent. Panel attrition seems to have maintained comparability of the di¤erent experimental groups, as far as observables are concerned.
Social and geographical centrality variables are summarized in Table 2 . The social centrality variable, chatting and kinship, were collected during the post-election survey and so we only display statistics for the post-election sample. We display average connectedness
de…ned above, with the exception of geographical distance, which is the symmetric of connectedness. We do not observe any statistically signi…cant di¤erences across comparison groups.
Finally, we display averages for our baseline voting variables at the ballot station level.
These are voting records from the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2004. Results are presented in Table 3 . We do not observe any statistically signi…cant di¤erences across comparison groups. Note that voting variables from our baseline survey are explored in full detail in Aker, Collier, and Vicente (2011) : since treated respondents were asked questions on politics after receiving lea ‡ets (for civic education and the hotline) and the newspaper, there may be di¤erences between comparison groups for the targeted due to …rst reactions or conformity bias. However, no clear evidence in favor of those e¤ects was found.
Average e¤ects
We start by presenting regression results of the average e¤ects of the campaign. These results are explored in full detail in Aker, Collier, and Vicente (2011) . We start with measures of political participation, which is the main intended e¤ect of the campaign. Looking at the reported values of the outcomes for control individuals …rst (as given by the intercept term in every second column -regarding regressions with no controls), we note that self-reported turnout is 86 percent, which is larger than all other turnout estimates. This suggests that respondents tended to over-report having voted, a feature of the data that is consistent with respondents regarding voting as a civic duty: if respondents had seen voting as a perilous or controversial activity, we would expect the opposite …nding, i.e., self-reported turnout lower than more objectively measured turnout. This being said, the lowest turnout measure still The average di¤usion e¤ect of the campaign on untargeted individuals is reported in Table   4b . We …nd statistically signi…cant di¤usion e¤ects for two treatments, newspaper and hotline. 14 If anything, point estimates are larger for untargeted than targeted respondents: averaged over the six measures (no controls), we …nd 10.5 and 9.2 percentage point increases in turnout among untargeted households for the newspaper and hotline treatments, respectively. The treatment e¤ect is also large for the civic education treatment, but it is only statistically signi…cant when using the adjusted turnout and no controls. Overall the result on the newspaper is particularly surprising given that the newspaper treatment has no statistically signi…cant e¤ect on turnout among the targeted. This suggests that the di¤usion e¤ect of the newspaper treatment is stronger than its direct e¤ect, perhaps because of magni…cation of the importance of the newspaper among individuals without direct access to it. In contrast, the civic education treatment increases turnout among the targeted but not among the untargeted, suggesting that it has a smaller and possibly negligible di¤usion e¤ect. We do no …nd signi…cant average di¤usion e¤ects for the open letter, even though the signs are the same as for the e¤ects on targeted individuals. 15 We now look at the e¤ects of the treatments on our measures of information and interest about politics. These are displayed in Table 5 for comparisons with targeted and untargeted respondents. From our conceptual framework we hypothesized that these are the likely mechanisms of change produced by the voter education campaigns: …rst, distributing information about the electoral process may convince voters of the integrity of the process, thereby raising
; second, the campaigns may increase non-instrumental motivation @U=@x i by raising civic-mindedness; both mechanisms explain higher political participation. We …nd signi…cant e¤ects of the hotline on increasing information about the elections. Speci…cally this e¤ect ranges between 16.5 and 23.3 standard deviation units for the targeted; for the untargeted it is equal to 22.6 standard deviation units (regression with controls). The newspaper also has a positive impact on information, which is signi…cant for the targeted (19.2 standard deviation units).
However, neither the hotline nor the newspaper had a clear impact on interest about politics.
The civic education treatment does not have any signi…cant e¤ects for any of these outcomes, even though the sign is consistently positive when analyzing impact on the information index.
Finally we provide in Table 6 average e¤ects of the treatments on the actual electoral outcomes (from o¢ cial voting records) at the level of the ballot station. We …nd clear positive e¤ects on voter turnout. These are particularly large for the newspaper and the civic education treatments: respectively 4 and 5.1 percentage points for the presidential elections, and 4.5 and 5.4 percentage points for the parliamentary elections. These e¤ects are signi…cant at the 5 (civic education) and 10 (newspaper) percent levels. These …ndings are reassuring as consistency to self-reported survey data is achieved. Note that estimates are comparable to the ones found for the targeted respondents. On voting patterns, we …nd a positive e¤ect of all treatments inked …nger). We …nd similar results regarding the hotline treatment among targeted and untargeted respondents: the e¤ect on turnout is positive and statistically signi…cant in all regressions, both for targeted and untargeted respondents. For the average di¤usion e¤ect, the newspaper treatment remains signi…cant in two of the three regressions, and civic education is signi…cant in one (at the 10% level only). Virtually identical results are obtained if we omit individual …xed e¤ects but include individual controls.
on voting for the incumbent president or party (FRELIMO) and a negative e¤ect of all treatments on voting for the main challenger candidate or party (RENAMO). However, only civic education actually achieves statistical signi…cance, and only for the parliamentary elections: it leads to a decrease in 4.9 percentage points on RENAMO's score. We therefore conclude that our treatments generally increased voter turnout and harmed the main challenger (bene…ted the incumbent).
Peer e¤ects on political participation
Next we turn to peer e¤ects. We focus here on political participation outcomes, i.e., voter turnout and text messages induced by the open letter proposal. In Table 7 we show our regressions relating to voter turnout, inked …nger measure. We employ the three centrality variables presented above: chatting, kinship, and geographic proximity. We start by measuring network reinforcement e¤ects through estimating regression (3.1) -results displayed in columns (1)-(3).
We then estimate network di¤usion e¤ects through estimating regression (3.2) -results displayed in columns (4)-(6). All regressions are estimated using follow-up variables only. We control for provincial dummies, EA characteristics and individual characteristics. The main focus is on the coe¢ cient of 1 N P j6 =i g ij and of the interaction terms
We obtain strong positive coe¢ cients for 1 N P j6 =i g ij particularly when using chatting and kinship as centrality measure, but also when using geographical proximity. This implies that, without treatment, individuals who are more central socially in their community are more likely to vote. This suggests that those individuals possibly feel more compelled than others to perform their voting duty. But from this data alone we cannot tell whether centrality causes people to be more civic-minded -e.g., because of social pressure or internalized norms -or whether more civic-minded people become more central -e.g., because they are more sociable.
The coe¢ cient of the interaction terms is negative for most treatments and centrality measures. We observe that reinforcement through geographical proximity is consistently negative and statistically signi…cant for all three treatments: the average respondent in the control group (in terms of geographical distance) sees a decrease in the probability of voting by 12.8, 13, and 11.1 percentage points through network reinforcement for the newspaper, hotline, and civic education, respectively. Statistical signi…cance also happens for di¤usion through chatting when considering the hotline treatment. There, the average respondent in the control group (in terms of chatting) sees a decrease in the probability of voting by 9.4 percentage points through network reinforcement for the hotline.
We display full results for turnout measure Index 1 in Table 8 . The same patterns of negative network e¤ects emerge. These are particularly prominent for the hotline, as all proximity variables yield negative reinforcement and di¤usion -the exception is reinforcement through geographical proximity, which is not signi…cant. Reinforcement through kinship for the civic education treatment also yields a negative e¤ect on voter turnout that is statistically signi…cant. Table 9 shows interaction coe¢ cients for the remaining voter turnout measures. Signi…cant e¤ects are all negative. The hotline stands out as inducing most network reinforcement and diffusion e¤ects. However, the newspaper also induces network reinforcement and di¤usion through geographical proximity (self-reported and interviewer assessment turnout measures); and civic education also induces reinforcement e¤ects through kinship and geographical proximity (selfreported and interviewer assessment turnout measures) 16 According to the conceptual framework presented in Section 2, these results suggest free-1 6 We also estimated average treatment e¤ects for the samples of targeted and untargeted individuals split into the 40 percent above the mean centrality and the 60 percent below the mean centrality. The …ndings described here are con…rmed. Similar -if not stronger -e¤ects are found if we combine baseline and follow-up survey data and apply individual …xed e¤ects.
riding: more central individuals are in a better position to realize, due to their centrality in the local network, that others are more likely to vote because of the campaign, and that the lag between incumbent and other candidates is likely to increase. Hence their own electoral participation is less necessary, and they the likelihood that they turn out to vote decreases. This e¤ect may be particularly relevant here, given that the dominant party enjoys such a large advantage over its two rivals so that the electoral outcome is predictable.
We now devote some attention to the open letter. Results for this outcome are displayed in Table 10 . We …nd statistically signi…cant e¤ects (at the 1 and 5 percent levels) for network reinforcement and di¤usion e¤ects of the civic education treatment when considering kinship.
These e¤ects are negative just like for voter turnout: they imply that the average respondent in the control group (in terms of kinship) sees a decrease in the probability of sending a text message by between 4 and 10.3 percentage points through network reinforcement for the civic education. We believe this result to be in line with the results for voter turnout in terms of interpretation as sending text messages is a costly participation action that can su¤er from free-riding.
We now summarize our results on political participation. We start with voter turnout. We …nd a strong e¤ect of the hotline treatment on targeted and untargeted individuals. Furthermore the e¤ect is largest among individuals who are less central in their community, either socially or geographically -with social centrality yielding a slightly more robust e¤ect. This e¤ect holds whether we consider targeted or untargeted individuals. We also …nd a clear e¤ect of the newspaper treatment on untargeted individuals, suggesting a magni…cation e¤ect through indirect treatment. A stronger e¤ect of the newspaper on less central individuals (geographically) is also identi…ed (for both reinforcement or di¤usion). In contrast, the civic information treatment only a¤ects targeted individuals. We do, however, …nd a stronger e¤ect of this treatment on targeted individuals who are less central socially or geographically. We now turn our attention to the open letter. We do not …nd robust e¤ects of the treatments on either the targeted and untargeted individuals. We do however …nd a pattern of results that is similar to turnout in terms of network e¤ects: less central individuals, in the social sense, are more likely to send text messages in response to the open letter proposal. Overall we …nd positive direct e¤ects but negative network e¤ects on political participation.
Information and interest about politics
We now seek to better identify the channel through which the treatments a¤ect political participation. We know we have some evidence that information about the election increased both for targeted and untargeted individuals. We could not …nd statistically signi…cant e¤ects for interest about politics. The question now is what the pattern is of network di¤usion and reinforcement e¤ects on information and interest about politics. We want to know whether these information and interest are transmitted across networks, and, if yes, whether there is free-riding (as for political participation).
Like in the last section, we employ the three centrality variables presented: chatting, kinship, and geographic proximity. We measure network reinforcement e¤ects through estimating regression (3.1) and network di¤usion e¤ects through estimating regression (3.2). All regressions are estimated using post-election data only. We control for provincial dummies, EA characteristics and individual characteristics. The main focus is on the coe¢ cient of 1 N P j6 =i g ij and of the interaction terms 1 N P j6 =i g ij T j (reinforcement) and Table 11 shows results employing our index of information about the elections. We only …nd a statistically signi…cant e¤ect: network reinforcement through kinship when analyzing the impact of the newspaper treatment. This e¤ect implies that the average respondent in the control group (in terms of kinship) sees an increase in the index of information of 0.07 standard deviation units through network reinforcement for the newspaper treatment. This is a relatively small e¤ect, but, di¤erently from political participation, it is positive.
Our index of interest about politics is analyzed in Table 12 . Here we …nd many more signi…cant e¤ects, all of which are positive. The newspaper has the most robust network e¤ects:
both reinforcement and di¤usion are channeled through kinship and chatting; only di¤usion is channeled through geographical proximity. All network e¤ects of the newspaper are signi…cant at the 1 percent level. They imply that: chatting increases interest by between 0.25 (reinforcement) and 0.29 (di¤usion) standard deviation units; kinship increases interest by between 0.12 (reinforcement) and 0.21 (di¤usion) standard deviation units; geographical proximity increases interest by 0.54 standard deviation units (di¤usion). We also …nd network reinforcement e¤ects for the hotline (through chatting and kinship) that are slightly lower than for the newspaper.
And we …nd both reinforcement and di¤usion network e¤ects for the civic education treatment, but only through chatting (also lower than for the newspaper).
The positive e¤ects we encounter for information and interest are in line with the average e¤ects on the targeted and the untargeted on these outcomes. This is despite the fact that we do not actually …nd any statistically signi…cant e¤ects when looking at the average impacts of the treatments on interest about politics. It then looks like information and interest were passed across networks, and that there was no free-riding produced on these outcomes. This may relate to the idea that information and interest about politics are cheaply transmitted across peers as they do not necessarily entail behavioral costs.
Concluding remarks
Using We …nd that network e¤ects on political participation are consistently negative, i.e., connectedness decreases participation in face of the voter education interventions. This is particularly clear for the hotline. Di¤erently, however, information and interest about politics are positively transmitted. We interpret these …ndings in the context of a voter participation framework where information and interest can be a¤ected by the voter education and subsequently change voter behavior. We argue that the sign of peer e¤ects depends crucially on the relevance of free-riding on others: lower participation of central individuals may have been produced by the sense that the campaign was driving more people to vote and was decreasing electoral competitiveness.
These results have implications for the design of voter education campaigns: while social networks tend to magnify cheap information and interest e¤ects, they tend to produce freeriding when costly behavior is elicited. However, we must emphasize that these …ndings may Note: Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. These results come from OLS regressions. Note: Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. These results come from OLS regressions. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Note: Regressions on targeted vs. control include observations for targeted (in treated locations) and control respondents; regressions on untargeted vs. control include observations for untargeted (in treated locations) and control respondents. All regressions are OLS and use only second-round data. We control for demographic characteristics, enumeration area characteristics and province dummies. Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the enumeration area level. 
